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Abstract
This article analyses the determinants of growing demand for agricultural land in
developing countries. We propose some determinants that are specific to foreign
acquisitions of agricultural land as a subset of agricultural foreign direct investment
(FDI) and empirically examine the corresponding locational choice. Using a gravity
model and a data set on land acquisitions worldwide, we find that the determinants
partly overlap with those for other forms of FDI but are specific in certain regards. Rich
investors target (poorer) economies with abundant land and water resources, and the
effects of the quality of institutions are ambiguous.
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1. Introduction
The increasing global interest in agricultural land, primarily in developing countries,
has attracted considerable attention in recent years. There has been an upsurge in
purchases and leases of land by foreign investors from the public and private sectors
with the intention to set up commercial farms for the production of agricultural
commodities. Recent data suggests that quite a number of these acquisitions of
agricultural land by foreign investors have already led to the establishment of farming
operations (Nolte et al., 2016). Both the land acquisition and the establishment of a
commercial farm are typically associated with capital inflows that qualify as
agricultural foreign direct investment (FDI).
A lack of data means that evidence on the drivers and implications of these land
acquisitions and investments remains scarce, and the findings are so far inconclusive.
Some broad patterns have been revealed by the analysis of the actors involved in these
transactions. Seaquist et al. (2014) find that most countries participate in the ‘global
land trade’, but that only a few countries account for the majority of land acquisitions.
The investors are from the Global North and the emerging economies of Asia and the
Middle East, which are typically countries with relatively little cultivable land and with
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high-tech agricultural sectors. The target countries, located in the Global South and
Eastern Europe, are relatively well endowed with cultivable land but have low
agricultural productivity. These observations lend support to the hypothesis that some
sort of ‘agricultural outsourcing’ to countries with abundant and possibly underutilised
land may be at work.
The empirical results on the factors driving FDI rely almost exclusively on data on
FDI in industry and services. However, FDI in the natural resource sectors or
agriculture has received only minimal attention (a few exceptions are Asiedu and Lien,
2011; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013; Hajzler, 2014). This is also due to the lack of
data on agricultural FDI, which is often not published because of confidentiality
reasons. To the best of our knowledge, hardly any previous empirical studies have
looked at the determinants of farmland acquisitions. An exception is Arezki et al. (2013)
analysis of the determinants of large-scale agricultural investments using a gravity
framework. That study confirms the prominent role of the agro–ecological potential of
target countries. Also, while the impact of the business climate turns out to be negligible
in their study, weak tenure security is associated with increased demand for land. The
authors conclude that the insignificance of the yield gap and the importance of weak
land governance suggest that interest in land may be driven more by speculation about
rising land prices than by actual investment projects aiming to undertake agricultural
production.
In the present article, we argue that there are indeed good reasons to hypothesise that
the importance of some FDI drivers may be different for acquisitions of agricultural
land. The availability of relatively cheap and fertile land should play a key role and
farmland acquisitions could be understood as demonstrating the competitive advantage
of land-rich countries in the competition to receive FDI (Burger et al., 2013).
Acquisitions of agricultural land can be viewed as indicating a new trend in FDI—
targeted at the agricultural sectors in developing countries. While agriculture is
declining in importance in terms of its contribution to global value added, it remains the
main source of livelihood for the world’s poor. In principle, farmland acquisitions may
contribute to higher agricultural productivity in receiving countries and possibly involve
positive spillovers, either within the agricultural sector or through backward and
forward linkages to the rest of the economy. Therefore, examining farmland
acquisitions, understanding its determinants and comparing them to those of FDI in
manufacturing generates interesting insights from both an international and a
development economics perspective.
This article makes two main contributions. First, it puts the increased interest in
agricultural land in the context of FDI. From a theoretical point of view, we analyse
whether the factors underlying acquisitions of agricultural land are different from those
underlying FDI in the manufacturing sector. Secondly, using data from the Land
Matrix Global Observatory, we empirically examine the locational choice of farmland
acquisitions. Thus, the study adds to that of Arezki et al. (2013), both conceptually by
explicitly taking a locational choice perspective and empirically by taking advantage of
improved data on farmland acquisitions.
We find that the determinants of foreign farmland acquisitions partly overlap with
those for other forms of FDI but are specific in certain regards. In particular, rich
investors target (poorer) economies with abundant land and water resources and the
effects of the quality of institutions are ambiguous. Better institutional quality in host
countries can even be associated with less land acquisitions: host countries tend to have
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low levels of investor protection and investors seem to tolerate higher levels of
corruption. Robustness checks using count regression or samples restricted to smaller
deals can partly explain deviations from previous studies. Specifically, our results
suggest that the effect of weak tenure security identified by Arezki et al. (2013) operates
through the extensive margin.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses which factors
determine acquisitions of agricultural land as a specific subset of agricultural FDI;
Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the methodology; Section 5 discusses the
empirical results; and Section 6 concludes the article.
2. Determinants of acquisitions of agricultural land
From a theoretical point of view, FDI flows are determined by three major factors.1
First, the organisational choice of individual firms plays an important role. This choice
depends largely on firm-specific factors, such as productivity and intangible assets (such
as technologies, managerial skills and brands), and can hence only be tested empirically
using firm-level data (Helpman, 2006; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Beugelsdijk et al.,
2010; Ottaviano, 2011).
Secondly, as the traditional literature has stressed, profit-maximising multinational
firms seek low-cost production locations. The locational choice can have various
motivations, such as resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-
asset-seeking objectives. These motivations differ for different types of investment and
have changed over time. While resource- and market-seeking objectives were previously
the determining factors for FDI flows, strategic-asset-seeking and efficiency-seeking
objectives are now often paramount—although market-seeking factors continue to be
recognised as a key driver of FDI flows in the manufacturing sector (Dunning, 1998;
Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 145–197).
Thirdly, firms assess whether it is worthwhile to internalise production abroad
through FDI or whether it makes sense to trade with or license a foreign producer
(Dunning, 1998, 2009). The decision to internalise production is driven by a variety of
factors that have been discussed in the more recent literature. For instance, the
governance of international transactions plays an important role. Incomplete con-
tracts—such as those regarding the protection of intellectual property rights—can be
overcome by internalising market transactions (Antra`s, 2005). Furthermore, trade
barriers influence the decision to enter a foreign market through FDI. While trade
barriers in manufacturing have been reduced to a minimum under agreements such as
the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade restrictions remain
commonplace in agriculture (Josling et al., 2010; Dennis and _Is can, 2011). Moreover,
market failures may explain why firms decide to set up a subsidiary through FDI. For
instance, input and factor markets in the rural areas of poor-target countries are highly
imperfect. Capital markets are underdeveloped, the supply of technical inputs such as
1 Dunning develops these factors in his OLI framework, which consists of three components driving
investment decisions: ownership (O), which encompasses all the company’s advantages over its rivals;
location (L), which includes advantages stemming from the location of production abroad; and
internationalisation (I), which describes the advantages to the firm of ‘internalizing’ production rather
than outsourcing it. Only if all these criteria are met does it make sense for a company to invest abroad
(Dunning, 1998, 2009).
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fertilizer is limited and even labour markets are sometimes hardly existent (Sexton,
1990; Josling et al., 2010). This has created a shortage of target-country suppliers that
could, in theory, be contracted and licensed to export the desired product. Investors can
overcome these input- and factor-market imperfections. However, trade or FDI in such
contexts involves high transportation and initial investment costs—for example, for
roads and irrigation (Dorward et al., 2004; Dethier and Effenberger, 2012). Where
states fail to provide basic infrastructure, these costs must be borne fully by the
investor. This implies that investors will wish to secure the returns on these investments,
which, in turn, partly explains why production is internalised (Collier and Venables,
2012). Finally, institutions and policies have been stressed as important determinants of
a firm’s decision to internalise. For instance, Busse and Hefeker (2007) analysed the
linkages between political risk, institutions and FDI inflows in developing countries.
Their cross-country data confirms the importance of political risk and institutional
indicators for investment decisions. Similarly, Gastanaga et al. (1998) studied the effect
of host-country policies on FDI flows for 49 less-developed countries. Pooled cross-
section and time-series data reveals that institutional characteristics have significant
effects on FDI. In particular, the authors identify detrimental effects resulting from
corruption and the negative linear influence of corporate tax rates. Such effects have
been shown by studies such as those by Wei (2000) and Cuervo-Cazzura (2006).
However, the more recent literature challenges this relationship. Explanations include
corruption distance (Wu, 2006) and different types of corruption (Egger and Winner,
2005; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008).
These theoretical arguments have typically been developed with an implicit focus on
manufacturing but they also apply to other industries, in principle. However, the weight
of certain (groups of) determinants may well differ between manufacturing and
agricultural FDI. In the following, we present four reasons why agricultural FDI may
be driven by different determinants.
First, investments in land and agriculture are related to the politically sensitive areas
of food and energy supply. Governments all over the world are concerned about food
prices and food supplies, particularly in poorer countries (Cotula et al., 2009). The
increasing use of agricultural produce for the production of energy adds to these
concerns (Dauvergne and Neville, 2009). Therefore, governments may strategically
secure access to resources for agricultural production, either directly or by supporting
the foreign operations of domestic firms. In the context of foreign farmland
acquisitions, it is not uncommon to find state-owned investors, particularly from the
Middle East. Ultimately, if the strategic considerations of ensuring food and energy
supply in investor countries are the main motivation for acquisitions of agricultural
land, the market-seeking objectives that are believed to play a prime role for FDI in
manufacturing (Dunning, 1998) should be less important.
Secondly, land and water are very specific production inputs. While some production
factors, particularly labour with specific skills and capital, are mobile, this is not the
case for (some) natural resources. In addition, land and water can hardly be substituted
in most agricultural production. Demand for agricultural products is growing due to
rapid population growth, increasing incomes and environmental factors such as land
degradation and desertification (Deiniger and Byerlee, 2011; Zoomers, 2010; Lambin
and Meyfroidt, 2011). Accordingly, land (and water) resources are increasingly being
put under pressure on a global scale. In sum, the immobility and non-substitutability of
land and water resources and their growing scarcity leads us to assume that, for
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investments in agriculture, the choice of production location is largely driven by
resource-seeking factors.
Thirdly, low land prices are particularly likely to attract farmland acquisitions—
relative to FDI in manufacturing (Collier and Venables, 2012). The (relative)
abundance of the immobile factor land in certain countries and input-market failures
(particularly frequent in rural areas in developing countries) imply that land
productivity and hence land prices are low. Indeed, land productivity is much lower
in large areas of sub-Saharan Africa (Adesina, 2010) and may be a pull-factor for
investors who expect high returns on their investment through increases in the
productivity of the acquired land. In many instances, however, investors acquire land
that is not yet under agricultural production, particularly forests and shrub/grasslands
(Messerli et al., 2014). Here, low prices may partly fail to reflect either the value
generated from communal uses or ecological functions that are not internalised by
proper institutions. In fact, institutional failure, specifically the lack of marketable land
rights, enables governments to use their legal authority as ‘owners’ of the land to assign
‘underutilized’ land to investors for low prices (Cotula et al., 2009). Low prices for land
also give rise to speculation (Collier and Venables, 2012).
Fourthly, the importance of institutions and policies, as discussed above, also holds
for farmland acquisitions, but there are some noteworthy peculiarities. Acquisitions of
land take place within a highly complicated land-administration system and a
politicised environment (Boone, 2014; Nolte, 2014). The distinguishing characteristic
of acquisitions of agricultural land vis-a`-vis non-agricultural investments is that the
former involve the acquisition of land as a key input factor—typically through a long-
term lease contract. While the acquisition of capital (or greenfield investment activities)
on the part of foreign investors is usually subject to an important array of formal rules
and requirements, the acquisition of land (especially in low- and middle-income
countries) takes place under land governance systems characterised by land use rights
that are often vaguely defined through overlapping formal and informal rules (Lund,
2006). Therefore, investors may be tempted to take advantage of ambiguous rules
(Nolte and Va¨th, 2015) or—to use a term coined by Toulmin (2009)—to engage in
‘institution shopping’. Furthermore, we expect investor country institutions to
condition their preference of institutional quality in host countries (Holburn and
Zelner, 2010). For instance, investors from countries with well-functioning institutions
and an open press may be more likely to respond to public pressure and opinion (or
anticipate this opinion and behave differently in the first place). Firms from such places
may also be more likely to submit themselves to investment principles and guidelines.
Investors from corrupt countries are more likely to invest in corrupt target countries.2
These four departures from the determinants of FDI in manufacturing do not imply
that farmland acquisitions are entirely different. We expect factors that influence trade
and information costs to matter equally for acquisitions of agricultural land, specifically
geographical distance, common official language and former colonial relationship.
However, we also expect some differences—for example, that resource-seeking factors
play a more pronounced role while market-seeking factors are less important. We
2 Another way to take different institutional set-ups into account is institutional distance between host and
investor countries, see for instance Wu (2006).
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assume that target countries with inefficient agricultural production are likely to be
targeted, and that institutions play a major role in investment decisions.
2.1. Hypotheses
From these insights, we derive testable hypotheses about what determines acquisitions
of agricultural land. We expect that a number of determinants that explain overall FDI
flows will play a role for this specific subset of agricultural FDI, as well. First, we
anticipate a negative relationship between farmland acquisitions and the distance
between two economies, while a joint official language and a former colonial
relationship should be conducive. Secondly, market-seeking factors, which are thought
to be important for FDI in manufacturing, are expected to be less important. Lastly, we
conjecture that institutions play a crucial role. We expect a positive relationship
between the general institutional quality in a host country and acquisitions of
agricultural land.
In line with the considerations above, we hold that some particularities of farmland
acquisitions are noteworthy. First, acquisitions of agricultural land seek to deal with
imbalances in food supply in the investor country; therefore, we expect that the net
importers of agricultural commodities are more likely to acquire agricultural land.
Secondly, we expect farmland acquisitions to be resource-seeking—in contrast to
market-seeking FDI in the manufacturing sector. Accordingly, we expect that land and
water endowments in host countries are positively correlated with acquisitions of
agricultural land. Thirdly, investors are attracted by low agricultural productivity in
target countries (and low land prices). Low agricultural productivity is believed to be
positively correlated with acquisitions of agricultural land, as this allows for relatively
quick productivity increases. Lastly, in addition to the hypotheses on institutions
derived from the FDI literature, we expect ambiguous effects of the institutional quality
of host countries. We hypothesise that ‘bad’ institutions in some areas—for instance,
weak land governance—may be associated with more farmland acquisitions. At the
same time, other institutions of good quality, such as a conducive business environ-
ment, may still lead to more investment in land and agriculture.
3. Data
Official FDI statistics are not usually broken down by sector; hence official data on
agricultural FDI are scarce or non-existent (FAO, 2013, 20). There is no official data
source for cross-border acquisitions of agricultural land specifically, and this gap is
currently filled by non-governmental initiatives, most importantly the Land Matrix
Global Observatory.
We have used Land Matrix data as of 20 May 2016 to construct our dependent
variable.3 While Arezki et al. (2013) used three different data sources, we took
advantage of the fact that the quality of the Land Matrix data has improved. The
improvements relate to methodological changes and the decentralisation of data
3 We use a sub-set of the whole Land Matrix database and restrict our sample to agricultural deals
involving at least one foreign investor. This sample includes a total of 947 deals, 732 of which have only
one investor and 215 of which have multiple investors (190 with two and 25 with three).
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collection leading to higher quality and quantity of data (Nolte et al., 2016).4 These
improvements in data quality also make it possible to use the size of projects instead of
the number of projects. We consider the acquired size a better estimate of the actual
investments into land than the mere number of projects.5 While keeping in mind that
Land Matrix data is likely to be biased (see below), we believe it is still the most
accurate estimate currently available; this view is shared by many scholars and
international organisations drawing on the same data source (Rulli et al., 2013; Messerli
et al., 2014; Seaquist et al., 2014).
The Land Matrix records acquisitions of land that entail a transfer of rights to use,
control or own land through sale, lease or concession; that cover 200 hectares or more;
that are targeted at low- and middle-income countries; and that have been concluded
since the year 2000. While acquisitions of land are not an entirely new phenomenon,
land acquisitions since about 2000 are considered quite distinct, as the scale and the
scope of the phenomenon have changed (Deiniger and Byerlee, 2011; Cotula, 2013) in
the context of the triple crisis of finance, food and fuel (McMichael, 2012).
Figure 1 shows the increase in land acquisitions since 2000 according to Land Matrix
data.
Because the total number of land acquisitions is not known, the Land Matrix can be
considered to be a sample of land acquisitions. It is important to note that the Land
Matrix data is likely to be biased, and most of these biases are introduced by the use of
Figure 1. Agricultural land acquisitions since 2000.
Source: Land Matrix Initiative (2016). N¼ 812 projects on 25.5 million hectares for which a
year is given.
4 In contrast to the data set used by Arezki et al. (2013), the Land Matrix data now distinguishes the different
negotiation and implementation status of deals. Consequently, we have only included deals for which we
know a contract has been concluded. We further know which of these deals have started production (see
Table 1). In addition, the Land Matrix has decentralized data collection and strengthened internal quality
assurance. This leads to higher quality data (rectify erroneous deals and duplications) and to higher quantity
(more deals enter the data base). As a result, we have used a different but improved data set: Arezki et al.
(2013) had 848 deals on 54 million hectares, while we have 947 deals—knowing that at least one contract has
been concluded. However, the total area has decreased: the 947 deals amount to 26.9 million hectares. This
can be explained by the fact that we only considered the area that actually comes under contract, while the
older data set included first media mentions of deals that were never concluded.
5 As data on financial flows that are related to foreign agricultural investment is not available, we have
relied on flows of physical units of land.
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media reports as an important source.6 This may result in certain regions, investors or
sectors being over-represented, while others may be neglected.
While the acquisition of large tracts of land in a foreign country qualifies as a
purchase of foreign assets, we can speak of FDI only if the acquisition translates into an
actual farming business with lasting investor interest and significant investor influence
(OECD, 2009). While data on land acquisitions are difficult to obtain, it is even more
difficult to collect information about the status of an agricultural investment project.7
Some acquisitions of land may be motivated by pure speculation motives and, in
contrast to investment projects in manufacturing, agricultural projects involve a higher
risk of failure and typically need much longer to reach full operation (Deininger and
Byerlee, 2012). However, Table 1 illustrates that an important number land acquisitions
are now turning into investments, although they often bring under cultivation only a
fraction of the originally acquired land. In our sample, a large share of the land
acquisitions—subsequently also referred to as ‘deals’ or ‘projects’—have started the
agricultural operations on the ground: 676 out of 947 deals (99 in ‘start-up phase’ and
577 ‘in operation’; see Table 1). For a further 175 cases, there is no information on the
implementation status; some of these cases may be land acquisitions out of speculation
motives.
Most foreign land acquisitions with subsequent farming operations involve foreign
investment, and can therefore be considered agricultural FDI. While the precise capital
flows associated with the establishment of farming operations are difficult to trace,
anecdotal evidence on specific investment projects (Cotula et al., 2014; Nolte and Va¨th,
2015), as well as the long duration of the leaseholds between 25 and 99 years (German et
al., 2013; Nolte et al., 2016), support the notion that foreign investors—once a project is
Table 1. Land acquisitions according to implementation status (only acquisitions with a concluded
contract)
Implementation status Number of
concluded deals
Contract size
(in million hectares)
Size under production
(in million hectares)
Project not started 59 2.7 n.a.
Startup phase (no production) 99 2.0 n.a.
In operation (production) 577 16.9 6.0
Project abandoned 37 1.1 n.a.
No information 175 4.2 n.a.
Sum 947 26.9 6.0
Source: Land Matrix Initiative (2016).
6 Records are derived from a variety of sources, including research papers and policy reports by
international and local organisations and NGOs, personal information contributed through the Global
Observatory website, field-based research projects, official government records, company websites and
media reports. Most deals have more than one source attached.
7 The status of land deals and the associated investments is constantly changing. The Land Matrix uses two
variables to describe the status of a deal: the negotiation status and the implementation status. The
negotiation status includes ‘intended’, ‘concluded’ and ‘failed’ deals; we have only used concluded deals.
The implementation status further distinguishes between ‘project not started’, ‘start-up phase (no
production)’, ‘in operation (production)’ and ‘project abandoned’. It is very difficult to follow the
implementation of a project.
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implemented—build-up a long-lasting relationship that typically includes a strong
influence on the farming operations and farm management.
Figure 2 provides an overview of where land is acquired and Table 2 indicates the
origin of hosts and investors. Our data set comprises 947 deals amounting to almost 27
million hectares distributed over 77 host countries. To put these figures into perspective,
the currently reported total size of 27 million hectares under contract amounts to about
Figure 2. Worldwide occurrence of foreign land acquisitions.
Source: Authors’ own image based on data from Land Matrix Initiative (2016).
Table 2. Origin of host and investor countries
Host countries Investor countries
# of concluded
deals
Size
(in 1000 ha)
# of concluded
deals
Size
(in 1000 ha)
Africa 399 11,177 69 953
Asia 279 4483 487 13,718
Europe 93 4594 313 6990
Latin America and Caribbean 141 4480 40 1422
North America n.a. n.a. 123 3810
Oceania 35 2213 6 55
Total 947 26,948 1038 26,948
Source: Land Matrix Initiative (2016).
Host countries are limited to low- and middle-income countries.
Deals that have more than one investor are counted twice (or thrice); the area is attributed to each
investor with equal shares.
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2% of global arable land. The hotspots for land acquisitions are located in sub-Saharan
Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe. The investors originate
from 72 countries, with the largest group coming from Asia, followed by the European
countries.
Figure 3 further investigates the distribution of the number and size of land
acquisitions by host and investor countries. The graphs plot the total area acquired and
the number of deals in (for host countries) and by (for investor countries) each country.
They show that most host and investor countries are in the bottom left of the graphs,
suggesting relatively few and small projects. For host countries, there is a quite distinct
group of countries with many (more than 50) land acquisitions, but only a moderate
total area (below 1 million hectares): Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Uruguay.
Ghana and Argentina are countries in which about 30 projects can be found with a total
area of 1 million hectares. Then there is a group of countries with relatively few
acquisitions (fewer than 50) but a very large total area (exceeding 1.5 million hectares):
Russia, Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Ukraine and Republic of the Congo. With more
than 100 deals on more than 3 million hectares, Indonesia is an outlier as a host
country, as is Malaysia as an investor country, both in terms of size and number of land
acquisitions. These outlier positions are related to palm oil investments. Two further
investor countries—the USA and Singapore—stand out in terms of total area acquired
and number of deals; the latter because of its role as a financial hub in Asia where
investment funds and holdings tend to be located. In addition, Great Britain and China
are important investors, particularly in terms of the number of projects. Vietnam has
many projects, particularly in neighbouring countries, although these tend to be
relatively small. Finally, Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, Hong Kong (again an
investment hub) and India emerge as important investor countries, all with a total of 1
million hectares (or just below) of land acquired.
To validate our results on foreign land acquisitions, we repeat our analysis with
bilateral FDI data. To have a comparable data set, we use UNCTAD data on bilateral
FDI flows and construct a cumulative figure of all bilateral flows from 2001 to 2012
(in millions of US dollars).8 We use exactly the same country pairs as in the
land acquisition data set. This means we use a very peculiar sample composed of
investor–host country pairs that allow only hosts from low- and middle-income
countries.
The Land Matrix and FDI data is complemented with additional variables to test our
hypotheses. All explanatory variables are taken from the year 2000—the same year the
Land Matrix started recording land acquisitions—to avoid problems of reverse
causality. A complete list of variables is included in Table 3.
As explanatory variables, we include standard gravity model variables, including
some bilateral variables (distance between two economies, common official language
and a former colonial relationship) and GDP as a proxy for market size. We further
include a dummy that turns 1 if a country is a net importer of agricultural products to
test whether the food demand in investor countries is driving land acquisitions. To
8 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) only covers this time period, which
is slightly shorter than the period covered by the Land Matrix (2000 to 2016). We add up all flows in the
host economy per year and treat missing and negative values as zeros. The cumulative figure is compiled
from individual country sheets obtained at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-
Statistics-Bilateral.aspx.
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measure resource endowments, we include the agricultural area as well as water
resources. Agricultural productivity is measured by the net production value for
agriculture per 100 hectares for permanent crops. To measure general institutional
quality, we use an indicator composed from the World Governance Indicators. As the
individual indicators are highly correlated, we compose one general institutional
indicator with principal component analysis.9 To measure specific institutions, we
include a number of alternative variables: the control of corruption rank (and as a
crosscheck the corruption perception index); the rank of political stability to measure
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Figure 3. Host and investor countries and the number and size of deals.
Source: Authors’ own image based on data from the Land Matrix Initiative (2016).
9 Using the Stata command ‘pca’ and rotated results (‘rotate’).
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Table 3. Definition of explanatory variables and source
Label Explanation Source Year
Main specification (see Table 6)
Weighted distance (log) Weighted distance between host
and investor
CEPII n.a.
Common official language Host and investor have a common
official language (dummy)
CEPII n.a.
Former colonial relationship Host and investor have a past
colonial relationship (dummy)
CEPII n.a.
GDP (log) GDP (absolute) in international
$constant 2005 PPP in 2000
WDI 2000
Net agricultural
productsimports
Dummy that becomes ‘one’ if
country imports agricultural
products
FAOStat 2000
Agricultural area
(in 1000 ha) (log)
Agricultural area FAOStat 2000
Water resources (log) Total annual actual renewable
water resources (m3/year)
FAO Aquastat
Agricultural productivity (log) Net production value for agricul-
ture, in constant 2004–
2006 1000 international $divided
by area for permanent crops in
100 ha.
FAO 2000
Institutions All six indicators of the World
Governance indicators are used
to compose one indicator via
principal component analysis.
We scale it between 0 and 1.
WGI 2000
Additional institutional variables (see Table 7)
Political stability Percentile rank of the political
stability indicator between 1
(low) and 100 (high political
stability)
WGI 2000
Control of corruption Percentile rank of the control of
corruption indicator between 1
(low control, high levels of cor-
ruption) and 100 (high control,
low levels of corruption)
WGI 2000
Changes in control of corruption Difference in the percentile rank
of control of corruption be-
tween 2006 and 1996.
WGI 1996/2006
Corruption perceptionindicator Corruption in the public sector,
indicator between 0 (highly cor-
rupt) and 10 (highly clean).
Transparency
International
2011
Land tenure insecurity Scaled between 1 (low insecurity)
and 4 (high insecurity)
IPD 2012
Investor protection Ranked according to the protect-
ing investor index, with higher
values indicating better
outcomes
Doing Business
Survey
2012
Changes in political stability Difference in the percentile rank
of political stability between
2006 and 1996.
WGI 1996/2006
(continued)
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protection of property rights, which can also be considered an alternative measure of
general institutional quality; we consider the land tenure insecurity index as a specific
measure of land governance; data from the Doing Business survey to capture the
business environment; and a dummy for host countries in which past expropriations of
resource-based FDI occurred between 1989 and 2006 (Hajzler, 2012). We also look into
changes in institutions and hence include a variable that measures the difference in
political stability between 1996 and 2006.10 To control for agglomeration effects
(Menghinello et al., 2010), we also include a variable that counts all the projects in a
host country. If a country already hosts projects, other investors might follow suit. We
also control for regional trade agreements and the total land area of a country.
4. Methodology
To test our hypotheses, we employ gravity model specifications that are widely used in
empirical analyses of bilateral trade flows and FDI. In contrast to the trade literature,
the FDI literature has not yet found a consensus on empirical specifications and is
perceived as undertheorised (Blonigen and Piger, 2014). Despite these shortcomings, we
believe that the rather ad hoc specifications of the FDI literature can offer important
empirical insights on the correlates of these flows (see, for instance, Chakrabarti, 2001;
Eicher et al., 2012; Blonigen and Piger, 2014).
A testable gravity equation is typically derived by taking logarithms of both sides of
the multiplicative form of the gravity model (Burger et al., 2009). The traditional
literature has used ordinary least square (OLS) to estimate these log-normal gravity
specifications; more recently, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) proposed employing
Poisson estimators, which can handle heteroscedasticity and are considered a
‘promising workhorse for the estimation of gravity equations’. These authors suggested
using a Poisson-pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator. This approach has
Table 3. Continued
Label Explanation Source Year
Risk of expropriation Dummy that turns 1 if there
occurred past expropriations of
resource-based FDI in a host
country between 1989 and 2006.
Hajzler (2012) 1989–2006
Number of deals Number of deals the host has in
total
Land Matrix 2000–2016
Regional trade agreements CEPII n.a.
Total land area Total land area (in km2) WDI 2000
Robustness checks
GDP per capita GDP/population WDI 2000
Population Population WDI 2000
Capital stocks in the agricultural
sector
Net capital stocks (agriculture,
forestry and fishery)
FAO 2000
10 We follow Arezki et al. (2016), who specifically looked into changes of institutions over time.
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some critics (Martı´nez-Zarzoso, 2013) but is generally approved of (e.g. Arvis and
Shepherd, 2013; Arezki et al., 2013; Haberly and Wojcik, 2014). We have followed the
literature and used a PPML estimator.
To describe our data set, we introduce some simple notation. Let yij be the sum (in
hectares) of all land acquired by investors from country j (referred to as investor
country) in country i (target or host country) with¼ f1;    ;Cg, with C being the
number of countries in the world and with i ¼ f1;    ;Pg where P is the number of low-
and middle-income countries in the world. We have only considered international
investments yij for all i 6¼ j:11
We constructed a bilateral data set of yij with i ¼ f1;    ;Pg and j ¼ f1;    ;Cg.
Hence, we consider all investor country–host country pairs, while excluding the
possibility of land being acquired in high-income countries. The data set ultimately
consists of 30,806 possible investor country–host country combinations12 and includes
146 possible target countries (77 of which are actually the targets of investment) and 212
possible investor countries (68 of which actually do invest). We regress pairs of land
acquisitions yij with i ¼ f1;    ;Pg and j ¼ f1;    ;Cg using a set of variables from target
country Xi, investor country Xj and characteristics of pair Xij as well as an error term ij.
PPML enables us to use the dependent variable, the sum of all land acquired from
country j in country i, without logarithmic transformation.
yij ¼ a0 þ a1Xi þ a2Xj þ a3Xij þ "ij
Investigating our dependent variable further, we noticed that it is skewed to the right
(excess of zeros) and overdispersed (variance is greater than the mean): 30,412
observations are zero observations and only 395 are non-zeros. The sum of all land
acquired varies: most observations are rather small in size, but we also found 42 host–
investor pairs with cumulative deals between 50,000 and 100,000 hectares and 63 pairs
with deals even amounting to more than 100,000 hectares (see Table 4). Both
problems—zero inflation and overdispersion—are addressed by the PPML estimator.
Correspondingly, we constructed a data set of bilateral FDI flows FDIij between an
investor country j in a host country i for the same set of countries.
We use two main specifications. The first tests a basic gravity equation with GDP,
bilateral variables and regional dummies.13 The second specification adds a number of
explanatory variables testing hypothesis on resource endowments, agricultural prod-
uctivity and institutions.
11 This study examines the determinants of foreign investment in agricultural land. Note that large-scale
farmland acquisitions often involve domestic investors.
12 146 target countries  212 investor countries ¼ 30,952. When we deleted the 146 domestic pairs, we ended
up with 30,806 possible combinations. We constructed our list from the World Bank list of economies as
of July 2013. However, in the regressions, we lost a large share of these possible combinations due to
limited data availability for the independent variables. Please see Online Appendix A available as
Supplementary data for a list of host and investor countries.
13 Land ownership structures and land governance stand out among regional particularities that matter for
land acquisitions. In many African countries, communal land rights play an important role, as do use
rights by smallholders, while land is often owned by the state (Boone, 2014).
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5. Results
5.1. Descriptive insights
For a first descriptive assessment of the determinants of land acquisitions, we compare
some key characteristics for the host and investor countries with regard to acquisitions
of agricultural land, and the host and investor countries for FDI. We present the means
of these country characteristics weighted by the share of area, respectively FDI flows,
acquired in or by host and investor countries in Table 5. The first two columns show
that host countries of farmland acquisitions are closer to the Equator, much poorer,
and have smaller populations and population densities than investor countries. The
availability of water and agricultural area are slightly higher in per capita terms for
hosts. While investors are clearly—on average—exporters of agricultural commodities,
host countries almost exhibit balanced trade in these goods. Investors have higher
agricultural productivity and capital stocks in agriculture. In addition, host countries
have much lower institutional quality, as highlighted by the variable for general
institutional quality as well as the variables on corruption, political stability, land
tenure insecurity (higher values here indicate higher land tenure insecurity) and investor
protection. Host countries have experienced an improvement in political stability but a
decrease in control of corruption (opposite for investor countries).
To contrast target countries of farmland acquisitions with those of aggregate (mainly
non-agricultural) FDI, we compared the host countries of farmland acquisitions to host
countries of all FDI (columns 1 and 3 of Table 5). (All) FDI host countries tend to be
further from the equator, bigger, and richer, with higher populations and population
densities. Considering the per capita terms, resource endowments of hosts in farmland
acquisitions are slightly higher. Institutional quality is slightly higher for (all) FDI
hosts; however, hosts of farmland acquisitions experienced an improvement in political
stability and have higher protection of investors. Generally speaking, host countries of
acquisitions of agricultural land are quite similar to (all) FDI host countries.
Comparing the investor countries for farmland acquisitions to those investing in FDI
(columns 2 and 4 of Table 5) revealed pronounced differences: the countries acquiring
agricultural land are closer to the equator, poorer, and have much higher populations
Table 4. Dependent variable: sum of all land acquired per host–
investor country pair
Sum of all land
acquired (in ha)
Number of host–investor
country pairs
0 30,412
200–1000 43
1001–5000 73
5001–10,000 51
10,001–20,000 47
20,001–50,000 75
50,001–100,000 42
Greater than 100,000 63
Source: Land Matrix Initiative, 2016.
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and population densities. In terms of resource endowments, there is no stark difference,
and institutional quality tends to be slightly higher for (all) FDI investors.
In sum, these descriptives tend to support the notion that the determinants of
acquisitions of agricultural land may be similar to those of overall (mainly other forms
of) FDI: investments flow from richer, more populous countries with relatively good
institutional quality towards poorer, less populous countries with lower institutional
quality close to the equator. However, we can also see that resource availability may
play a more important role for agricultural investments. Interestingly, agricultural
productivity and capital stocks in agriculture are very low in host countries of farmland
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for different groups of countries
Farmland acquisitions FDI
Weighted
all farmland
acquisition host
countries
Weighted
all farmland
acquisition
investor
countries
Weighted all
FDI host
countries
Weighted all
FDI investor
countries
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Distance from Equator
(in degrees of latitude)
18 25 25 37
Land area (in km2) 2,509,698 2,348,940 4,852,312 3,573,003
GDP (in bn. internat. $) 153 1827 543 3383
GDP per capita 3614 24,063 5355 28,805
Population (in mn) 48 1026 86 236
Population density (per km2) 74 137 377 148
Agricultural area (in 1000 ha) 61,347 104,325 188,223 134,912
Agricultural area per capita 0.83 0.76 0.50 0.91
Water (m3) 1504 873 2117 1220
Water (in l) per capita 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Net agricultural imports (in USD) 0.72 1,068,873 7691 678,261
Agricultural productivity (output
per area in 1000 internat. $)
11,801 89,054 18,489 154,780
Capital stocks in agriculture
(per agricultural area in ha)
289 64,260 761 17,470
Institutions 0.29 0.71 0.38 0.81
Control of corruption (percentile rank) 28 73 40 82
Control of corruption changes in
percentile rank (2006–1996)
2.9 0.2 0.2 0.0
Corruption perception
(Transparency International)
3 6 3 7
Political stability (percentile rank) 25 64 31 73
Political stability changes in
percentile rank (2006–1996)
3.0 3.8 2.1 8.8
Land tenure insecurity 2 1 2 1
Protecting investors rank 90 131 86 125
Sources: (FAO, 2015a, 2015b; CEPII, 2015; Laitin et al., 2012; Land Matrix Initiative, 2016; Transparency
International, 2016; UNCTADstat, 2015; World Bank, 2015a, 2015b).
Each degree of latitude is 111 km apart.
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acquisitions. The statistics also suggest some ambiguity in the role of institutions. For
example, we observe the biggest improvement in political stability in host countries of
farmland acquisitions.
5.2. Econometric results
The results of the PPML estimation for land acquisitions and FDI are displayed in
Table 6.14 Looking first at land acquisitions in columns (I) and (II), we can assert that
the bilateral variables yield the expected results. Distance has negative effects; for
example, a 1% increase in distance reduces the sum of all land acquired by 0.87% (1.1
for the second specification), an effect of similar magnitude to the estimates by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for trade flows. A common official language and a former
colonial relationship are positively correlated with the amount of land acquired.
Secondly, host country GDP turns negative in the second specification but remains
insignificant. Hence, our second hypothesis seems to be confirmed: market-seeking
objectives are not important for farmland acquisitions, with the market size of host
countries losing importance after controlling for other factors. For investors, we find
positive effects for GDP; hence, larger economies are more likely to engage in
acquisitions of agricultural land.
Thirdly, concerning our hypothesis that investors seek to deal with imbalances in
food supply, we were unable to find any support for this with a negative and statistically
significant coefficient for the dummy indicating that investors are net agricultural
importers. If an investor is from a country that is a net importer of agricultural
products, the sum of all land acquired is reduced by more than 80%. This implies that
net agricultural exporters, which are likely to have internationally competitive
agricultural sectors, tend to acquire more land. The effect for host countries is also
negative and weakly significant; hence, if a host country is net importing agricultural
commodities, it has a lower chance of hosting farmland acquisitions.
Fourthly, the findings on the variables related to resources support the hypothesis
that the resource endowments of target countries matter. For host countries, we do find
positive statistically significant effects for the agricultural area and water resources. For
investor countries, the agricultural area and water resources are statistically
insignificant.
Fifthly we cannot confirm that (highly productive) investors are attracted by low
agricultural productivity (and possibly low prices of land): host country agricultural
productivity has a positive effect (although not significant).15
Sixthly, we cannot find significant effects of our composite institutional indicator for
host countries. Thus, better overall institutional quality does not seem to attract land
14 To check the robustness of our results, we run a simple OLS (see Online Appendix B available as
Supplementary data) using the same specification as for the PPML estimator. We use a logarithmic
transformation of the cumulative hectare size, log(yij þ 1). The results are generally consistent with the
results presented above, but the size of the effects is much smaller for the OLS coefficients. One
difference is that host institutions turn out positive and weakly significant.
15 We also test for capital stocks in agriculture that are equally not statistically significant for host
countries. For investor countries, we find negative and strongly significant effect of capital stocks on
farmland acquisitions; that is, higher capital stocks in investor countries’ agriculture are associated with
lower areas of land acquired. This finding is likely to be related to the importance of investors from
developing countries that tend to have lower capital stocks than high-income countries.
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Table 6. Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood estimation
Dependent variable
yij FDIij
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Weighted distance (log) 0.869 1.110 1.049 1.017
(0.173) (0.200) (0.172) (0.0908)
Common official language (dummy) 1.106 0.934 1.554 0.552
(0.311) (0.398) (0.612) (0.209)
Former colonial relationship (dummy) 0.927 1.032 0.177 1.128
(0.371) (0.445) (0.477) (0.248)
Host GDP (log) 0.334 0.135 1.013 0.505
(0.0708) (0.128) (0.119) (0.109)
Investor GDP (log) 0.622 0.593 0.730 0.748
(0.0539) (0.110) (0.0477) (0.0937)
Host agricultural area (log) 0.635 0.107
(0.246) (0.194)
Investor agricultural area (log) 0.0741 0.221
(0.218) (0.136)
Host water resources (log) 1.026 0.0297
(0.289) (0.0655)
Investor water resources (log) 0.00476 0.138
(0.103) (0.0870)
Host net agricultural products Imports (dummy) 0.675 0.280
(0.385) (0.130)
Investor net agricultural products Imports (dummy) 0.842 0.149
(0.314) (0.162)
Host agricultural productivity (log) 0.288 0.0994
(0.245) (0.112)
Investor agricultural productivity (log) 0.0233 0.0103
(0.108) (0.0559)
Host institutions 1.056 1.579
(1.082) (0.440)
Investor institutions 2.175 4.317
(1.318) (1.181)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,790 19,116 23,790 19,116
R-squared 0.111 0.183 0.299 0.558
RESET test (p-value)21 0.3108 0.2759 0.0544 0.9387
PPML estimation for farmland acquisitions (yij) and FDI (FDIij), main specification. Constant included but
not reported. Controls included but not reported: regional trade agreements (always positive), total land
area for host and investor countries (logged) in specification II (for hosts: negative and significant for land
acquisitions; positive and significant for FDI; investors: always negative, strongly significant for FDI) and
number of deals host (always positive, strongly significant for land acquisitions).
p50.1, p50.05, p50.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
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acquisitions. However, this result may hide ambiguous effects of different types of
institutions; we explore this issue further below. Investor countries’ institutions have a
positive and weakly significant effect.
Comparing these results with the results for FDI reported in columns (III) and (IV),
we note certain differences. First, host countries’ GDP remains positive even after
adding other variables, and therefore confirms an important role for market-seeking
objectives of FDI. Secondly, the proxies for land and water resources remain
insignificant and are not systematically linked to decisions on FDI. Thirdly,
institutions, both for host and investor countries yield positive and strongly significant
results for FDI. Hence, in contrast to farmland acquisitions, good institutions of host
countries seem to be conducive to receiving FDI.
To assess the effects of institutions in more detail, we use specification II for land
acquisitions and the FDI of the former model but replace the composite institutional
indicator by a number of both investor and host institutional variables, including the
control of corruption percentile rank, the political stability percentile rank, an index of
land tenure insecurity (between 1 and 4) and the rank of the investor protection index of
the Doing Business survey. The results are reported in Table 7, (full results are reported
in Online Appendix C available as Supplementary data).
This reveals important differences with regard to the effects of different host country
institutions on land acquisitions for agriculture vis-a`-vis FDI. First, while host country
corruption control (i.e. better control of corruption, or less corruption) significantly reduces
the amount of FDI a country receives—by 2% for each percentile rank it climbs in the
corruption ranking—there is only a small and insignificant effect for land acquisitions.16
For our particular sample, which is restricted to low- and middle-income host countries, we
find a positive correlation between corruption and FDI. This result could be partly due to
an important part of FDI driven by (omitted) mineral resource endowments, which have
often been associated with higher levels of corruption (see, for instance, Papyrakis and
Gerlagh, 2004). Secondly, political stability in the host country helps to attract FDI, while
no significant correlation can be found for land acquisitions. However, when we test for an
effect of changes in host countries’ political stability (between 1996 and 2006) we find a
positive and strongly significant effect for land acquisitions (not significant for FDI).17
Thirdly, for land tenure insecurity we cannot find significant effects for neither FDI nor
land acquisitions. Fourthly, we find opposite significant effects of host countries’
institutions to protect investors. There is a negative correlation between land acquisitions
and investor protection in host countries while the same correlation is positive for FDI and
investor protection, although the effects are relatively small.18
16 This result is robust to using the Transparency International Corruption Perception index (see Online
Appendix C available as Supplementary data, specification IIb). We also test for an effect of changes in
institutions by looking at the changes in the control of corruption rank between 1996 and 2006; even here
we find a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient for host countries of farmland acquisitions and FDI.
We report these results in the Online Appendix C (specification IIc) available as Supplementary data.
17 We report these results in the Online Appendix C (specification IIc) available as Supplementary data.
18 We also test a dummy for expropriation that becomes 1 if past expropriations of resource-based FDI
took place in a host country (Hajzler, 2012). The effect of this dummy is negative but insignificant for
land acquisitions but positive and strongly significant for FDI: if the host country has a history of
expropriation, the FDI flows are expected to increase by 51%. Hence, countries in which expropriations
happened have a relatively high chance of receiving FDI. This may again be related to (omitted) mineral
resources. Results are reported in Online Appendix C (specification IId) available as Supplementary
data.
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In sum, the general institutional quality in host countries—in contrast to FDI—does
not play a big role. It is specific institutional qualities that explain the positive
correlation for FDI: political stability and investor protection. At the same time,
investors seem to be willing to tolerate (or even be attracted by) corruption. For land
acquisitions, low investor protection appears to be a risk that investors are willing to
take.
5.3. Robustness checks
To test the robustness of the above results and add further insights, we first use different
specifications, then use different data samples restricted to only operational projects
and different deal sizes and finally repeat the analysis with count data. In particular, the
latter enables us to scrutinise differences in our results compared to those of Arezki et
al. (2013). While we can confirm the importance of resources, we cannot confirm their
finding that weak land tenure security is associated with increased foreign demand for
Table 7. Pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood estimation. Different specifications with additional
institutional regressors (excerpt, see full results in Online Appendix available as Supplementary data)
Dependent variable
yij FDIij
(IIa) (IIa)
Host control of corruption 0.00545 0.0217
(0.00842) (0.00482)
Investor control of corruption 0.00319 0.0377

(0.0114) (0.0121)
Host political stability 0.00544 0.0313

(0.00708) (0.00476)
Investor political stability 0.0101 0.00751
(0.00629) (0.00556)
Host land tenure insecurity 0.0397 0.0692
(0.154) (0.111)
Investor land tenure insecurity 0.264 0.382

(0.167) (0.147)
Host investor protection 0.00758 0.0110
(0.00355) (0.00133)
Investor investor protection 0.00957
 0.00185
(0.00378) (0.00166)
Controls Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 11,520 11,520
R-squared 0.232 0.629
RESET test (p-value) 0.0532 0.2831
Excerpt of PPML estimation with additional institutional regressors for farmland acquisitions (yij) and FDI
(FDIij). Specification (II), institutions_pca replaced by the respective institutional variable.
p50.1, p50.05, p50.001.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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land. Moreover, we find a negative (positive) effect on land acquisitions if investors are
net importers (net exporters) of agricultural commodities.
First, we include population and then GDP per capita (both in logs) in our basic
gravity specifications (III and V) and in our augmented gravity specifications (IV and
VI) (see Online Appendix D available as Supplementary data), following other
contributions in the empirical FDI literature (Blonigen and Piger, 2014). However, we
clearly prefer the above main specification to these robustness checks, especially
because the inclusion of one (potential) regressor (here population), in the denominator
of another regressor (here GDP per capita), implies problems of interpretability.
Generally speaking, our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables.
Investor countries’ population is negatively associated with land acquisitions and
FDI—but is significant only in the case of FDI; that is, less populous countries tend to
be engaged more in FDI. For host countries, the population effect is insignificant for
both land acquisitions and FDI. The coefficient of GDP per capita is positive for
investor countries (and significant in the case of FDI); for host countries of land
acquisitions, the effect is positive and significant (with the negative effect of GDP
turning significant—as compared to specification II in Table 6). In a final specification
check, we then include investor- and host-country fixed effects (VII, last column of
Online Appendix D available as Supplementary data) to account for multilateral
resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Results for the bilateral variables
remain unchanged, so this specification provides evidence for the general suitability of a
gravity model to describe our data.
Results using different sub-samples are reported in Online Appendix E available as
Supplementary data (using specifications (I), (II) and (III)). The first sub-sample only
includes operational projects that are reported to be in the start-up phase or in
production. The results are generally consistent with the results from the full sample
and we can therewith rule out that observed acquisitions are mainly driven by land price
speculation. We now find positive and strongly significant effects of host countries’
agricultural productivity, suggesting that projects are more likely to be implemented in
contexts with better agricultural infrastructure and/or more previous commercial
agricultural activity. Overall, host country institutional quality—as measured by the
composite index and included (Online Appendix E, column II available as
Supplementary data)—has a negative and strongly significant effect on land acquisi-
tions. The results on specific institutions (column III) suggest that this result is driven by
corruption control (now negative and weakly significant) and the low levels of investor
protection (as before) in host countries. We then use a subset of the data that excludes
very large projects (those over 100,000 hectares), as well as a sub-sample that is
composed only of large projects (those over 100,000 hectares), and, finally, a subset that
only includes land acquisitions smaller than 10,000 hectares. Results are generally
consistent with our previous results, but some of the effects appear to be conditioned by
the size of the projects. Very large projects seem to drive the positive link between
agricultural area in host countries and land acquisitions, while host countries’ water
resources remain significant across all sub-samples. In the samples without large
projects and the one that uses only small projects, the effect on investors who are net
importers of agricultural commodities loses significance. Further, the effect of host
country land tenure insecurity becomes significant for the sample of (relatively) small
projects. The effect is large—a unit change in the index (with values of 1 to 4) towards
less insecure land tenure results in a 62% increase in the area of acquired land, thus
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confirming a key result of Arezki et al. (2013), albeit only for these land acquisitions of
smaller size.
A final set of robustness checks uses the same specification with count data: the
dependent variable is the number of investments projects nij of investor country i in
target country j. We use a zero-inflated negative binomial regression,19 as proposed by
Burger et al. (2009). Results are generally consistent with the results presented above
(see Online Appendix F available as Supplementary data). The differences between the
count and the ‘size’ model can be rationalised by the differences that we have observed
for different size categories above. Thus, one difference in the count model is that the
effect of host countries’ agricultural area is no longer significant and has a negative sign
in the main specification. This may simply reflect that the size of potentially available
land matters more for larger projects. Host countries’ water resources again remain
positive and highly significant. The dummy on investors who import agricultural
commodities turns positive. This is closer to the result of Arezki et al. (2013) of an
important role for net food importers in land acquisitions. Similarly, the count model
yields a positive but insignificant correlation between land tenure insecurity and land
acquisitions—another key result of Arezki et al. (2013).
Taken together, the robustness checks have confirmed our main results. A few
particularities are noteworthy. First, concerning resources, host countries’ water
resources remain positive and strongly significant throughout all robustness checks,
although the positive effect of agricultural area seems to stem from larger projects.
Secondly, for operational projects, agricultural productivity of host countries is
positively associated with the area of land acquired. Moreover, for these projects,
institutional quality, including the control of corruption, is negatively associated with
land acquisitions. Thirdly, two main differences between our results and those of Arezki
et al. (2013) seem to be related to the different dependent variables: number and size of
projects. For the sample with smaller projects, as well as in our count regression, we
obtain similar (albeit not as strong and significant) results regarding land tenure
insecurity and investors importing agricultural commodities. This suggests that very
large-scale investments in land may partly be driven by other factors than smaller
investment.
6. Conclusion
Acquisitions of agricultural land indicate new interest in the agricultural sectors in
developing countries, as well as a move towards the commercialisation of agriculture
19 Given our data that is zero-inflated and overdispersed, this seems to be the best model choice. However,
we also tested alternative models and started off with a Poisson regression, than used a negative binomial
model. AIC and BIC criteria and the likelihood ratio test confirm that the negative binomial
specification fits better with our data. Comparing the negative binominal and a zero-inflated negative
binominal model, AIC, BIC and Vuong statistics prefer the zero-inflated negative binominal model.
Zero-inflated models assume that zeros are generated by two distinct processes, which makes sense
both from a methodological and a theoretical point of view if one expects many zeros to be missing
values. Zero-inflated models assume two latent groups: a group that is always zero (i.e. it never has the
chance to have an investment) and a group that has a probability greater than zero to have positive
counts (i.e. there is a chance of having investments). Zero-inflated models first estimate a logit regression
that indicates how variables influence the ‘always–zero–group’ and a negative binomial regression/
Poisson for those in the ‘not-always-zero-group’ (Long and Freese, 2006). We display only the results
from the ‘not always zero group’ (see Online Appendix G available as Supplementary data).
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worldwide. This article makes two main contributions to a better understanding of the
drivers of these farmland acquisitions. First, we have argued that farmland acquisitions
are a specific subset of agricultural FDI and have developed corresponding hypotheses
on the determinants of this specific subset vis-a`-vis FDI in manufacturing. According to
these hypotheses, farmland acquisitions should be driven, like any other form of FDI,
by the desire to find a low-cost production location, the choice to internalise
production, and the organisational choice of the investor. Thus, most determinants of
FDI in manufacturing can be transferred to this specific form of agricultural FDI; for
example, a common language, a former colonial relationship or the distance between
economies. However, we also assume that there are several ways in which acquisitions
of agricultural land are different. The quest to secure access to food and energy
resources is believed to play a major role in such acquisitions, while market-seeking
factors may be less important. Land and water endowments should be salient because
these immobile inputs cannot be substituted and because global economic growth
places considerable pressure on land and water as key resources. Land prices in many
developing countries are low, which reflects the low agricultural productivity and/or
land market failures that imply that prices do not reflect the value of the land under
potentially higher productivity. Thus, low prices might attract agricultural investments.
Finally, land acquisitions take place under land governance systems with vaguely
defined and overlapping land rights. Therefore, investors might be tempted to take
advantage of this situation and be attracted by these ‘bad institutions’.
Our second contribution is that we tested these hypotheses using a data set on large-
scale land acquisitions, which we compared to (ordinary) FDI flows. Descriptive
insights suggest that the determinants of acquisitions of agricultural land partly overlap
with those for other forms of FDI with a more important role of agricultural resources,
particularly the availability of water, for farmland acquisitions. We have further tested
these hypotheses using a PPML estimator and a bilateral data set of acquisitions of
agricultural land and FDI worldwide. The results suggest that rich investors target
(poorer) economies with abundant resources. Indeed, market-seeking objectives play a
minor role for land investment. Moreover, standard determinants of trade and FDI
flows, such as geographical and socio-political distance, also matter for farmland
acquisitions. At the same time, we find no support for the conjecture that investors seek
to deal with imbalances in food supply at home. Instead, net exporters of agricultural
products are those that acquire land. This may reflect the fact that firms from countries
with competitive agricultural sectors are investing in land to internalise production due
to difficult conditions in target countries; in particular, credit and input market failures
and the lack of the provision of adequate infrastructure. We also find that host
countries are exporters of agricultural commodities, which hints at a tradition of
agricultural exports that facilitates foreign agricultural investment. These results are
particularly strong when we reduce the sample to projects that have already become
operational. Evidently and not surprisingly, we can confirm that the availability of land
and—even more—the availability of water resources is a key determinant of the
locational choice of farmland acquisitions. Furthermore, we find no support for the
hypothesis that investors seek to invest in countries with low agricultural productivity.
Instead, our results hint at a positive association between host countries’ agricultural
productivity and the area of farmland acquired (again stronger for projects in
operation). This could speak against large technology spillovers from high-productivity
to (very) low-productivity countries through this type of investment. However, the lack
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of clear results on this aspect could also be explained by limitations of the proxy used:
low agricultural productivity is likely to also capture poor land quality. Further, our
results show that the general institutional quality in host countries plays no major role
in the locational decision and could even be associated with less land acquisitions. This
negative correlation between land acquisitions and institutional quality can be
explained by low levels of investor protection—and high levels of corruption for
operational projects—in host countries. However, we cannot confirm the result that
countries with very bad land governance systems would be particularly attractive to
investors. Thus, land investors seem to be willing to tolerate some deficiencies in specific
institutions. For FDI, we find a similar ‘tolerance’ (only with low- and middle-income
target countries for our particular sample) with regard to corruption, but not for the
lack of investor protection. Our series of robustness checks generally confirms these
main findings, but also partly explains deviations from previous studies, particularly
regarding the role of land tenure insecurity and net food importers as investors.
Analyses based on sub-samples restricted to smaller project as well as count regressions
yield results closer to Arezki et al.’s findings (2013), suggesting that some aspects of the
locational decision of land acquisitions are conditioned by the size of the project.
With these theoretical considerations and empirical insights, we also contribute to a
wider debate. Foreign direct investment outside manufacturing—be it in agriculture,
mining and also in services—is often politically controversial. Therefore, analysis of
locational choices in these sectors not only addresses a gap in the academic literature,
but can also contribute to rationalising the policy discourse. For example, our analysis
does not support the common perception that land in developing countries is mainly
acquired by land and water scarce countries that are securing access to food supplies
elsewhere—as implied by the term ‘land grab’ that is often used with reference to these
acquisitions. In light of the real-world relevance of the issue, therefore, it may seem
surprising that so few studies have analysed the determinants of non-manufacturing
FDI. However, a lack of data is to blame here, as it is for many understudied issues, and
it is astonishing how little data there is. The present study uses a very peculiar data set
on large-scale land acquisitions. While we believe that studying this data set has yielded
some very interesting insights on the determinants of this specific sub-set of agricultural
FDI, it also places important limitations on our analysis. For example, some of the
cases of land acquisition may represent pure speculation on higher future land prices,
while other acquisitions—in fact, the vast majority as shown by our data—lead to
agricultural production. In addition, we must rely on flows of physical units of land and
future work will hopefully be able to draw on data on financial flows that are related to
foreign agricultural investment. Moreover, regional differences within national
boundaries cannot be accounted for. This may be particularly important for land
and water resources; for example, if investors acquire land in the few water-rich and
fertile regions in a country that, overall, has little water and little fertile land. Improved
spatial data might allow a more fine-grained analysis soon. Such data—ideally with a
time dimension—would also enable researchers to analyse whether and how agricul-
tural projects become operational and how they affect land use. For a better
understanding of the investment decision and, specifically, the role of land-related
institutions, improved information on former (before the land transaction) and current
land ownership and use rights will be required. With such data, certain aspects of the
investment decisions could be further investigated. For example, certain types of
investors may prefer to avoid any complications that arise in situations where private or
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communal use rights are overlapping with state ownership, as is often the case in sub-
Saharan Africa.
To conclude, our analysis of international locational choices in agriculture through
land acquisitions highlights an important and—at this scale—recent facet of global-
isation. In some parts of the world, this phenomenon can potentially have major
implications for rural and often very poor populations, as well as for the local and
global environment. Some results from our analysis—such as the ambiguous effects of
institutions and the quest for water resources—are indications that these acquisitions
may under certain conditions have detrimental effects.
Supplementary material
Supplementary data for this paper are available at Journal of Economic Geography
online.
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